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 processes have already inspired practical applications such as lie 
detection, neurofeedback and neuromarketing. To avoid harm due 
to a misapplication or misapprehension of scientifi c knowledge, it 
is important to refl ect on methodological and conceptual limita-
tions of neuroimaging.
The aim of this article is to explore the challenges in developing 
real-world applications for functional neuroimaging. Though we 
restrict our discussion to fMRI, currently the dominant technology 
in neuroimaging research, many of the same issues exist for EEG, 
PET and MEG. We begin by briefl y describing what fMRI measures, 
and outlining the standard procedure for fMRI experimental design 
and analysis. We then consider some of the limitations inherent in 
using blood-fl ow as a surrogate for neuronal responses, in particu-
lar when studying individuals taking psychotropic medications. 
We cover some fundamental statistical issues, most importantly 
the diffi culty of making inferences about individual participants 
on the basis of group-level analyses. These considerations are com-
plemented by an analysis of the conceptualisation and individua-
tion of anatomical areas. We conclude by considering two attempts 
to extend neuroimaging beyond the laboratory: lie-detection and 
prediction of treatment response in psychiatry.
MEASUREMENT AND ANALYSIS
WHAT DOES fMRI MEASURE?
One of the main advantages of fMRI, besides its good spatial 
resolution, is that it measures brain function without the need 
to infuse any contrast agents. Because of the general tolerability 
of high magnetic fi elds, it is considered a “non-invasive” method, 
though the heating of tissue due to electromagnetic radiation, 
the induction of currents and the exposure to noise have to be 
controlled to ensure safety. Its most common variant in neuro-
science, blood oxygen-level-dependent (BOLD) imaging, is based 
INTRODUCTION
Functional neuroimaging has arguably had the biggest impact of 
any technique in furthering our understanding of how the brain 
processes information. Electroencephalography (EEG), positron 
emission tomography (PET), magnetoencephalography (MEG) 
and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) have revealed 
profound insights into human brain function. These fi ndings 
have enabled neuroscientists to bridge the gap between studies 
in experimental animals and patients with brain damage, reveal-
ing striking similarities in brain structure and function in animals 
and humans.
The stated goal of much neuroimaging research has been trans-
lational. As neuroscientists often write in the concluding paragraphs 
of publications, or when justifying grant proposals, we would like to 
understand how the human brain works so that disorders in which 
it goes wrong might be better understood, treated and ideally even 
prevented. This is a laudable aim, and notably many pioneers in 
the fi eld of functional neuroimaging are clinicians. Unfortunately, 
in the two decades since fMRI was invented, its impact outside 
the laboratory, in particular clinically, has been negligible. Though 
functional neuroimaging is often said to hold the promise of assist-
ing in diagnosis, predicting treatment response, informing the 
development of novel treatments and perhaps even revolutionizing 
psychiatric nosology, these promises have yet to be fulfi lled.
In the meantime, neuroimaging in cognitive neuroscience 
has celebrated huge successes outside of clinical contexts. It is 
widely believed that these new methods of investigating brain 
structure and function have revealed new insights into cogni-
tion, emotion, and human nature. Recent studies using fMRI 
have indeed  investigated complex mental capacities such as moral 
and legal judgment, empathy, deception and economic decisions. 
The reported  associations between brain activation and mental 
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on the magnetic properties of haemoglobin, in particular that 
deoxy-haemoglobin distorts its surrounding magnetic fi eld, while 
oxy-haemoglobin does not. In the strong magnetic fi elds generated 
by MRI  scanners – thousands times stronger than the earth’s natu-
ral magnetic fi eld – this fi eld distortion measurably reduces the 
magnetic resonance signal produced by hydrogen atoms following 
stimulation by a radio pulse at their resonance frequency. Thus, 
blood containing a higher concentration of deoxy-haemoglobin 
results in a lower BOLD signal.
The concentration of deoxy-haemoglobin depends on the cer-
ebral metabolic rate of oxygen (CMRO
2
), cerebral blood fl ow (CBF) 
and cerebral blood volume (CBV). The common model assumes 
that neuronal activity increases oxygen consumption, increasing 
deoxy-haemoglobin concentration (Heeger and Ress, 2002). After 
about 2 s, this initial change is followed by increased CBF, over-
compensating for oxygen consumption and increasing CBV due 
to the elastic properties of blood vessels. The overall measured 
response, called the haemodynamic response function (HRF), 
refl ects the residual effect of changes in CMRO
2
, CBF and CBV 
and lasts 16–32 s.
Two different accounts have been proposed to explain the latter 
part of the HRF. The fi rst considers the oxygen overcompensation as 
a by-product of the glucose metabolism which is linked to synaptic 
activity and depends on astrocytes, a kind of nerve cell fulfi lling 
its energy demand through non-oxidative glycolysis. According to 
this explanation, the BOLD response is only indirectly linked to 
neural activity, and primarily refl ects incoming signals from other 
cells processed at the neurons’ synapses (e.g., Fox et al., 1988). The 
second account emphasises the neurons’ need for oxygen, fulfi ll-
ing their energy demand through the oxidation of lactate during 
periods of increased activity (e.g., Buxton and Frank, 1997).
In an infl uential study, Logothetis et al. (2001) recorded electri-
cal and haemodynamic activity simultaneously in the visual cortex 
of monkeys. Their results showed a strong correlation of the BOLD 
signal with local fi eld potentials refl ecting synaptic activity and 
thus supported the fi rst account. The signal also correlated with 
the measurements refl ecting neural spiking, but less strongly and 
particularly for shorter durations of stimulation. Generally, these 
fi ndings supported the view that BOLD fMRI is a reliable, though 
indirect indicator of neuronal signals received within a certain por-
tion of brain tissue. In cognitive neuroscience, fMRI researchers 
employ software packages supplying approximations of the HRF 
in order to test whether the observed signal matches the expected 
BOLD response. From this, they infer that neuronal activity in a par-
ticular region is related to a particular experimental condition.
HOW DO WE GET TO BLOBS ON BRAINS?
fMRI data typically consist of a time-series of several hundred 3D 
images, representing the BOLD signal across the brain over a period 
of time, with each image acquired every few seconds. These images 
contain many thousands of 3D pixels, or voxels, which represent the 
spatial unit of measurement of fMRI. The images are manipulated 
in a number of ways prior to analysis, called pre-processing. First, 
the images must be realigned, such that they all lie in the same 
space. Researchers may correct for the fact that different image 
slices were collected at slightly different times. The images are often 
co-registered to an anatomical scan and then spatially-normalised, 
i.e. squashed and stretched to match some template image. Finally, 
the images are smoothed (blurred) slightly, which accommodates 
the heterogeneity in individual anatomy.
Pre-processed BOLD images are then subjected to subject-level 
analysis. During data collection, the times (onsets) of each of the 
events of interest are recorded. These onsets are used to create the 
statistical model (design matrix), with which the data are analysed. 
Since the BOLD responses associated with neuronal activity occur 
slowly, the form of each event is modifi ed to match the form of an 
average HRF, a procedure known as convolution. The convolved 
onsets of the different types of events form the explanatory vari-
ables, or regressors, in the design matrix. It is important to realize 
that this convolution process means that fMRI and PET can never 
have the same temporal resolution as EEG or MEG. Their poor 
ability to determine when responses in the brain occurred is not 
simply a technical limitation; the physiological process they meas-
ure is itself very slow.
The slow timescale of the HRF also has important ramifi cations 
for designing sensitive scanning experiments. The most sensitive 
(effi cient) tasks are those that present alternating stimuli/tasks at 
roughly the same timescale of the HRF; this type of experiment 
is said to have a block design. However, many psychological tasks 
operate on a much faster timescale, and block designs may be 
inappropriate in some cases. Therefore, researchers may adopt 
more complex designs in which many events in a task are mod-
elled, using shorter timescales, known as event-related designs. 
While event-related designs allow for a more sophisticated inter-
pretation, they suffer an inherent disadvantage because the events 
being studied happen so quickly, relative to the timescale of the 
HRF. This means that event-related designs are invariably less 
sensitive than block designs, requiring more subjects or time spent 
in the scanner.
Whichever design is used, in standard fMRI analysis a mass-
univariate approach is common, in which linear regression is 
performed at each voxel separately to estimate the magnitude 
of the effect of each regressor. This magnitude, the parameter 
estimate or beta value, is equivalent to the slope of the regres-
sion line. The result of this analysis is a new set of brain images, 
beta images, which summarize the effects a given regressor on the 
BOLD response.
Parameter estimates generated from the same model can be 
 compared directly to create contrast estimates. Statistical values can 
also be generated, from which it is possible to infer at a given voxel 
whether the BOLD signal differs between two or more conditions. In 
a  simple design, for example remembering 4 versus 8 items, the con-
trast estimate value can be conceptualised intuitively as the  difference 
in the amplitude of the BOLD signal between the two  conditions, 
much as one might calculate a reaction time difference.
Group-level analysis is conducted using the beta or contrast 
images as summary-statistics. This analysis is also usually performed 
using a mass-univariate approach, conducting a t-test at every voxel 
across the whole brain. This is the fi nal stage of standard fMRI 
analysis, and results in an image of statistical values, which can be 
thresholded at a given value to identify regionally-specifi c effects 
that are statistically reliable across participants. The threshold 
will be quite conservative to account for the many thousands of 
 statistical comparisons performed.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org December 2009 | Volume 3 | Article 63 | 3
Schleim and Roiser fMRI in translation
For ease of viewing, voxels are coloured according to t-values, 
with warmer colours indicating more signifi cant values. These 
statistical images can be overlaid on an anatomical scan, giv-
ing rise to the familiar presentation of blobs on brains. What is 
 important to remember is that these blobs do not represent  activity 
per se. Instead, they represent statistical values, calculated from 
 subject-level parameter estimates, which were themselves based on 
BOLD signal changes. These are not trivial points, and give rise to 
several challenges in interpreting fMRI data.
CHALLENGES IN INTERPRETING fMRI DATA
HOW NEURAL IS THE BOLD SIGNAL?
The language prevalent in the interpretation of BOLD fMRI data 
suggests a tight coupling between the measured signal and neural 
processes. References to neural “activation”, “bases”, “circuits”, “cor-
relates”, “processes”, “substrates” and so on are abundant (Figure 1). 
However, from the previous discussion it should be clear how many 
assumptions and intermediary steps are required in the logical 
chain from the statistical result to the common metaphor of neu-
ronal activity.
Previous research has shown that the BOLD effect can be infl u-
enced, eliminated, or even inverted by age or disease (D’Esposito 
et al., 2003) and that in some circumstances lower neural  activation 
is associated with stronger BOLD signals (Marcar et al., 2004). 
Recent experiments identifi ed situations in which neural  activation 
is not refl ected in a BOLD increase or, vice versa, that BOLD 
responses can be identifi ed in the absence of neural activation 
(Schummers et al., 2008; Sirotin and Das, 2009). Another study 
recording electrical signals as well as BOLD responses in patients 
awaiting  neurosurgery suggested a heterogeneous relationship 
between  different brain areas. Ekstrom et al. (2009) reported the 
expected correlation of both measurements only in the parahip-
pocampus, not in the hippocampus.
Regarding the common interpretation that the BOLD signal 
refl ects synaptic activity, critics refer to alternative neurobiologi-
cal accounts of the haemodynamic response, emphasizing the 
removal of lactate, adjustment of the acid-base or ionic balance of 
the tissue or temperature regulation (Raichle and Mintun, 2006). 
Logothetis whose earlier research supported the prevailing explana-
tion (Logothetis et al., 2001) himself recently concluded that the 
“fMRI signal cannot easily differentiate between function- specifi c 
processing and neuromodulation, between bottom-up and top-
down signals, and it may potentially confuse excitation and inhi-
bition” (Logothetis, 2008, p. 877). While many of these issues are 
being addressed by basic research and will likely be clarifi ed in 
the future, they essentially limit our current understanding of the 
BOLD response in terms of neuronal activation.
EFFECTS OF MEDICATION
One of the diffi culties in interpreting fMRI data collected in 
patients with psychiatric disorders is the effect of medication. 
Most papers comparing groups of psychiatric patients with  controls 
test patients who are predominantly, if not exclusively, taking psy-
chotropic medications. One effect of medication may be either 
to induce apparent differences between groups in terms of brain 
responses, or perhaps to mask effects that are really there. This 
 problem is appreciated in psychiatric research generally, for exam-
ple in interpreting behavioural data.
3000
Talking about fMRI in neural terms
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FIGURE 1 | Although the neuronal basis of the fMRI signal remains controversial, researchers frequently associate them with each other. Shown are the 
results of a topic search for “fMRI” and the respective neural keyword on ISI Web of Science.
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However, measures of brain responses based on blood-fl ow 
face further interpretative diffi culties. This is because many of 
the medications used to treat psychiatric disorders also affect the 
brain’s vasculature directly, either constricting or dilating blood 
vessels. Indeed, the neurotransmitter serotonin, which most anti-
depressants increase, was originally identifi ed, and named, due to its 
constricting effect on blood vessels (“sero” – serum; “tonin” – tone: 
Rapport et al., 1948). Therefore, if differences in brain responses 
are observed between medicated patients and controls, it is dif-
fi cult to interpret whether the differences represent: (1) the effect 
of the illness itself; (2) the effect of the medication on neuronal 
responses; (3) the effect of the medication on the vasculature, inde-
pendent of effects on neuronal responses. For example, Kumar 
et al. (2008) reported that administering anti-depressants to healthy 
volunteers induced quite similar patterns of BOLD responses to 
those observed in medicated depressed patients, compared with 
unmedicated healthy volunteers. What is not clear, however, is 
whether the anti-depressants affected neuronal responses, the 
brain’s vasculature, or even both.
The medication confound could be addressed in a number of 
ways. The best strategy is to test unmedicated patients. However, 
unmedicated patients may be diffi cult to recruit, and could have a 
less severe illness than medicated patients, introducing a selection 
bias. Alternatively, it may be possible to administer medication to 
healthy volunteer subjects. However, this might raise ethical issues, 
and the effects of medication could be different between healthy 
volunteers and patients. Finally, it is possible to estimate the shape 
and amplitude of the BOLD response independent of neuronal 
activity by employing a simple breath-hold test (Bright et al., 2009). 
While this procedure cannot completely circumvent the aforemen-
tioned confounds, such data may aid the interpretation of studies 
comparing medicated patients and unmedicated controls.
MULTIPLE COMPARISONS AND EFFECT SIZES
A feature of brain imaging that might be considered both a 
strength and a weakness is the enormous amount of data collected 
(Kriegeskorte et al., 2009). Since many thousands of statistical com-
parisons are conducted, making it very likely that false positives 
would be observed, it is necessary to perform correction for mul-
tiple comparisons when determining whether an effect is reliable. 
However, often we are not simply interested in the question “is 
there an effect”; additionally, we often wish to know “how large 
is this effect”. This can be expressed in terms of the standardised 
effect size (Cohen’s d) when comparing means, or the correlation 
co-effi cient (r) when examining linear relationships.
The issue of multiple comparisons in neuroimaging is well 
known, and standard techniques have been developed to address 
it (Friston et al., 1991). What is often not so readily appreciated 
is the effect of multiple comparisons on effect sizes. Since brain 
imaging data are smooth (i.e., the response in a given voxel will 
correlate strongly with the response in its neighbours), different 
voxels in a small volume of a functional brain image essentially 
contain a large number of highly correlated observations. When 
making statistical inference (i.e., rejecting the null-hypothesis), it 
is common to analyse only the voxel producing the maximal sig-
nal, known as the “peak voxel”, with an appropriate correction for 
multiple comparisons. However, when researchers come to plot 
the contrast estimates of interest at this voxel, the effect of size will 
necessarily be over-estimated. This is because the voxel chosen for 
display is the “best of the bunch”. To put it another way, means will 
appear more different from each other, and points on a scatterplot 
will appear closer to the regression line, than really they ought 
to. This is a particular problem when small numbers of subjects 
are included (N < 30 per group), as is often the case in expensive 
neuroimaging studies (Yarkoni, 2009).
The resolution to this problem is not trivial, and an extensive 
discussion is beyond the scope of this article (Kriegeskorte et al., 
2009). Suffi ce it to say that peak voxel-based brain imaging analy-
ses may appear to produce impressively large effect sizes, often 
much larger than seen in behavioural studies. Although, assuming 
appropriate correction for multiple comparisons was employed, 
these effects probably exist (i.e., they are non-zero), their magni-
tude should not be taken at face value. This is not just a statistical 
issue, but is extremely relevant for real-world applications. If the 
apparent predictive value of brain responses is infl ated, the value 
of using such measures in a real-world setting is less than it may 
at fi rst appear.
GROUPS VS. INDIVIDUALS
DISCRIMINATION
While MRI has had a major impact in neurology practice, its pen-
etrance into psychiatric clinics has been negligible. Currently, it 
would be quite reasonable to describe MRI as purely a research tool 
in psychiatry, with no diagnostic or treatment utility. At fi rst glance, 
this might seem surprising, given the large number of MRI papers 
published that include psychiatric patients, often with compelling 
results, and the extensive use of MRI in neurology.
In essence, the difference in the use of MRI between the two 
clinical disciplines relates to discriminability. If a neurologist orders 
an MRI scan for a patient he suspects to have a tumour or stroke, 
when the scan is examined there is a very high probability that, if 
the abnormality is there, it will be seen. Unfortunately, this is not 
the case in psychiatry. At the gross anatomical level, the brains of 
patients with psychiatric disorders look broadly similar to those 
of controls. There may be subtle differences in the volumes of dif-
ferent brain regions, perhaps not appreciable with the naked eye, 
but it is certainly not the case that almost every patient will look 
different to a healthy volunteer. The same is true for functional 
scans. While on average, amygdala BOLD responses to negative 
emotional faces may be reliably elevated in groups of currently 
depressed patients (Leppanen et al., 2004), this does not translate 
into saying that every depressed patient will show elevated amygdala 
BOLD responses, or that subjects with greater BOLD responses will 
be depressed. Moreover, as discussed above, while plotted data may 
give the impression that the patient and control groups are almost 
entirely separable in terms of BOLD response in a given region, if 
the plot is based on the peak voxel this will be an overstatement.
Hence, the diagnostic utility of MRI in psychiatry is currently 
limited. Without clear hypotheses about functional or structural 
outcomes based on the clinical observation and anamnesis of a 
particular patient, we do not recommend that patients should 
generally undergo expensive and potentially burdening neuroim-
aging procedures. The number of possible sequences and experi-
mental paradigms to highlight different aspects of brain function 
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and structure is vast. An investigation of a Japanese program that 
allowed people to voluntarily undergo MRI examinations without 
a medical reason suggested that clinically relevant fi ndings occur 
too rarely to justify their general introduction into the standard 
diagnostic procedure (Tsushima et al., 2005).
ANATOMICAL VARIABILITY
Although we have emphasized the importance of brain function, 
all approaches of localisation presume a thorough understanding 
of brain structure, that is, anatomy. The brain is a highly organised 
structure on different levels, from the microscopic to the mac-
roscopic. Understanding the human mind by means of localis-
ing brain function requires understanding both the relationship 
between brain structure and function and between brain function 
and mental processes. The success of the project of human brain 
mapping is therefore subject to our anatomical knowledge. To go 
from the brain to the mind, logical step called “reverse inference” 
is frequently employed (Poldrack, 2006). Its power is dependent on 
the brain’s functional specialisation: the more functions are realized 
within one area, the less certain is the engagement of a particular 
function when activation within this area is found.
Of course, researchers can take steps to reduce the number of 
plausible cognitive processes that might be indicated by an area’s 
activation. For example, they could adapt established psychological 
or experimental designs to their purposes. Yet, if these decisions 
guaranteed the presence of a certain cognitive process, then the 
further measurement would be superfl uous; if at least some uncer-
tainty remains before the neuroimaging experiment, the fi ndings 
will have to be interpreted to some extent by relating particular 
brain areas to those processes they (putatively) process. As long as 
a respective imaging method depends on spatially localised infor-
mation, the anatomical knowledge of the brain will constrain the 
interpretation of its data. Even newer multivariate approaches 
looking for spatially extended patterns of brain activation eventu-
ally depend on anatomical information to explain their fi ndings 
(Haynes and Rees, 2006).
Each brain is unique and it would potentially take an expert 
several hundreds of hours to provide a fi ne-grained distinction of 
all of its anatomical parts. One way to deal with this is to operate 
with high-level concepts, which are roughly classifi ed according 
to their spatial order. For example, the middle frontal gyrus is the 
middle ridge on the frontal lobe, located between the superior 
(upper) and the inferior (bottom) frontal gyri. However, even more 
coarse-grained labels, for example “dorsolateral prefrontal cortex”, 
are used frequently. This label roughly relates to that part of the 
frontal lobe located very much in front (prefrontal), towards the 
top (dorsal as opposed to ventral) and more on the side (lateral as 
opposed to medial), and consists of several anatomical structures. 
Understandably, experts disagree about its precise delineation, and 
in extreme cases one researcher’s dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
(Greene et al., 2004) can be another’s medial frontopolar cortex 
(Moll and de Oliveira-Souza, 2007). Since the spatial localisation 
of brain activations is essential – qua reverse inference – for the 
association with cognitive processes, an imprecise localisation will 
also yield an imprecise understanding of the engagement of the cog-
nitive process. But even if this conceptual hurdle is cleared, we still 
need a procedure to identify brain areas in experimental data.
Thus, researchers invariably transform their individually 
recorded anatomical and functional images into a standardised 
reference space during pre-processing. This transformation proc-
ess in itself is complex, involving linear and non-linear manipula-
tions and approximations, and is usually followed by smoothing 
to account for inter-individual variability. Common reference 
spaces are Brodmann areas, Talairach space and the atlas of the 
Montreal Neurological Institute. The fi rst is based on the micro-
scopic investigations of the German neuroanatomist Korbinian 
Brodmann (1868–1918); the second on one hemisphere of the brain 
of a 60-year-old French woman; and the third on 305 anatomical 
MRI images of young (on average 23.4-year old), right-handed, 
North-American and mostly male healthy volunteers (Evans et al., 
1993). These atlases obviously represent only a small part of the 
human population.
Some neuroscientists, aware of these limitations, have proposed 
a project to improve anatomical localisation (Mazziotta et al., 
2001). When this work is completed, it will allow researchers to 
determine the probability with which a co-ordinate in the brain 
belongs to a certain area in a particular population. Obviously, this 
probability is subject to inter-subject variability and will be smaller 
in more variable portions of the brain, for example, the neocortex. 
Furthermore, its accuracy will be limited by the individual history 
of each subject, including diseases, accidents and lifestyle, and the 
prevalence of variations of the norm and abnormalities in the brain 
was even as high as 25% in a sample of 2,500 healthy, young males 
(Weber and Knopf, 2006).
Much less is known about the variability of brain function 
since the statistical methods in neuroimaging experiments are 
usually chosen to identify similarities, not differences between 
subjects. Yet, if there is no signifi cant result within a brain region, 
this could mean either that there was no change in activation 
at all (a similarity between subjects) or that the variance was 
too high (a difference). The idiosyncrasies of the “language” of 
each brain will essentially limit the possibility of transferring 
neuroscientifi c knowledge about one brain or group of brains 
to another. The technical possibility of a general “mind-read-
ing” device is thus subject to the identifi cation of stable patterns 
of activation representing certain mental contents, taking ana-
tomical and functional variability within and between subjects 
into account.
The upshot of these issues is that each map demonstrating the 
statistical signifi cance of a functional fi nding should ideally be 
accompanied by a second map demonstrating the likelihood that 
its location belongs to a given brain region. While the language 
employed by many neuroscientists to explain brain imaging fi nd-
ings suggests a high degree of certainty regarding the identifi cation 
of individual areas, this confi dence is not usually refl ected in the 
commonly-used anatomical localisation techniques.
CONCLUSION
Neuroimaging has increased our knowledge about human brain 
function tremendously. We wanted to identify the challenges in 
understanding its results in the practical domain. While many of 
these issues have been investigated in basic research, they limit 
the scope of contemporary clinical and cognitive neuroscience. 
Particularly when claims about individual subjects are involved, 
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we recommend extreme caution. Recent projects approaching 
“mind-reading”, lie detection and the prediction of future criminal 
behaviour directly target the individual and promise applications in 
a vast number of social contexts. While the benefi ts of some uses are 
clear, for example enabling disabled patients to regain behavioural or 
communicative capacities, the possible risks of others, for example 
judging the veracity of a statement in a courtroom, are abundant as 
long as the respective method is not built on a solid foundation.
In the clinical domain, some studies have attempted to use brain 
imaging to characterize individuals who subsequently respond to 
treatment in terms of BOLD responses, for example in depressed 
patients (Seminowicz et al., 2004; Fu et al., 2007). Fu and col-
leagues (Fu et al., 2007) presented a graph depicting an impres-
sively strong relationship between BOLD responses to positive 
facial stimuli in the lingual gyrus, hippocampus and cerebellum 
and response to the anti-depressant fl uoxetine (r > 0.6). This could 
potentially be a very important result, since clinicians currently 
have no way of predicting which patients will respond well to a 
particular anti-depressant. However, since this result was based on 
a voxel-wise analysis, and only signifi cant voxels (at p < 0.005) were 
included in the scatterplot, it is almost certain that the prediction 
would not be so strong when looking at responses in the same 
voxels in another group of patients. This is not to say that such 
studies are not useful – being able to predict treatment response 
is potentially one of the most important clinical applications of 
fMRI. However, the number of studies, variable results and lack 
of independent validation experiments means that this line of 
research is still in its infancy. Nonetheless, if the challenging rel-
evant longitudinal studies required are carried out, the implica-
tions for psychiatric practice could be profound.
How relevant are the described theoretical problems to the prac-
tical application of BOLD fMRI? Could one argue that as long as 
powerful technical devices and statistical tools yield results with a 
suffi cient predictive value in the real world, the theoretical issues 
do not have to be resolved? To some extent, it is indeed an empiri-
cal matter whether a data-driven approach is more successful than 
a theory-driven approach. Brain-computer-interfaces are a good 
example because they allow an online-evaluation of the method’s 
functioning, that is, whether the subject is able to make meaningful 
interactions with the computer. However, the information necessary 
for such an evaluation may be unavailable for a present decision in 
other situations because it is hidden in the past (e.g., lie detection) 
or the future (e.g., prediction of disease or treatment response).
Particularly the issue of fMRI-based lie detection is  interesting 
in this respect because it is already offered by commercial com-
panies, and has received ethical and legal attention urging for 
regulation (Greely and Illes, 2007). If the information necessary 
for validation (i.e., the truth) was already available, the applica-
tion of the lie detector would be unnecessary. If it was unavail-
able, an individual who is truly a liar would try to hide it by all 
means. Without a general “mind-reading” device to directly and 
unequivocally identify the meaning or contents of an individual’s 
brain activity pattern as deceptive, an approach interpreting brain 
activation and comparing it with samples of other individuals or 
groups is subject to the limitations we addressed here. The dan-
gers of classifying a statement erroneously as right or wrong, say, 
in a legal setting are obvious, as are the dangers of an erroneous 
medical decision.
However, there certainly are other real-world applications to which 
at least some of our discussion does not apply. “Neuromarketing” 
or “neuropolitical” research, which predicts general consumptive or 
voting preference, needs not to worry about the transferability of 
group fi ndings to individuals since its scope consists of aggregated 
behaviours. Yet, its inferences are subject to our knowledge of the 
brain when investigating, for example, whether an advertisement 
reliably activates “pleasure circuits”, and to general standards of the 
ecological validity of experiments. Moreover, such conclusions will 
invariably make use of some form of the reverse inference scheme, 
and as such require careful validation (see e.g. Krajbich et al., 2009 
for a study that successfully provided such validation). The infer-
ential connection between localised differences in brain activation 
and cognitive processes certainly affects many interpretations in 
neuroimaging research in general and requires further theoretical 
and basic research.
In conclusion, knowledge regarding anatomical localisation, 
individual variability of brain structure and function, the neural 
component of the BOLD signal and the statistical procedures used 
in the analysis of fMRI data are often neglected in the interpre-
tation of neuroimaging results relating to practical applications. 
Unfortunately, this trend continues in public science communi-
cation, as the tone of the majority of reports in the print media 
is uncritical, particularly when health-related research – where 
hopes and risks are highest – is covered (Racine et al., 2006). 
Acknowledging these issues is one of the fi rst steps towards under-
standing neuroimaging better, its possibilities and limitations, both 
in applied research and public perception.
REFERENCES
Bright, M. G., Bulte, D. P., Jezzard, P., and 
Duyn, J. H. (2009). Characterization of 
regional heterogeneity in cerebrovas-
cular reactivity dynamics using novel 
hypocapnia task and BOLD fMRI. 
Neuroimage 48, 166–75.
Buxton, R. B., and Frank, L. R. (1997). 
A model for the coupling between 
cerebral blood flow and oxygen 
metabolism during neural stimula-
tion. J. Cereb. Blood Flow Metab. 17, 
64–72.
D’Esposito, M., Deouell, L. Y., and 
Gazzaley, A. (2003). Alterations in 
the bold fMRI signal with ageing and 
disease: a challenge for neuroimaging. 
Nat. Rev. Neurosci. 4, 863–872.
Ekstrom, A., Suthana, N., Millett, D., 
Fried, I., and Bookheimer, S. (2009). 
Correlation between BOLD fMRI 
and theta-band local fi eld potentials 
in the human hippocampal area. J. 
Neurophysiol. 101, 2668–2678.
Evans, A. C., Collins, D. L., Mills, S. R., 
Brown, E. D., Kelly, R. L. and Peters, 
T. M. (1993). 3D statistical neuro-
anatomical models from 305 MRI 
volumes. In Proceedings of the IEEE 
Nuclear Science Symposium and 
Medical Imaging Conference, Vol. 31, 
pp 1813–1817.
Fox, P. T., Raichle, M. E., Mintun, M. A., 
and Dence, C. (1988). Nonoxidative 
glucose consumption during focal 
physiologic neural activity. Science 
241, 462–464.
Friston, K. J., Frith, C. D., Liddle, P. F., and 
Frackowiak, R. S. (1991). Comparing 
functional (PET) images: the assess-
ment of signifi cant change. J. Cereb. 
Blood Flow Metab. 11, 690–699.
Fu, C. H., Williams, S. C., Brammer, 
M. J., Suckling, J., Kim, J., Cleare, A. 
J., Walsh, N. D., Mitterschiffthaler, 
M. T., Andrew, C. M., Pich, E. M., 
and Bullmore, E. T. (2007). Neural 
responses to happy facial expressions 
in major depression following antide-
pressant treatment. Am. J. Psychiatry 
164, 599–607.
Greely, H. T., and Illes, J. (2007). 
Neuroscience-based lie detection: the 
urgent need for regulation. Am. J. Law 
Med. 33, 377–431.
Greene, J. D., Nystrom, L. E., Engell, A. D., 
Darley, J. M., and Cohen, J. D. (2004). 
The neural bases of cognitive con-
fl ict and control in moral judgment. 
Neuron 44, 389–400.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org December 2009 | Volume 3 | Article 63 | 7
Schleim and Roiser fMRI in translation
Haynes, J. D., and Rees, G. (2006). 
Decoding mental states from brain 
activity in humans. Nat. Rev. Neurosci. 
7, 523–534.
Heeger, D. J., and Ress, D. (2002). What 
does fMRI tell us about neuronal activ-
ity? Nat. Rev. Neurosci. 3, 142–151.
Krajbich, I., Camerer, C., Ledyard, J., 
and Rangel, A. (2009). Using neural 
measures of economic value to solve 
the public goods free-rider problem. 
Science 326, 596–599.
Kriegeskorte, N., Simmons, W. K., 
Bellgowan, P. S., and Baker, C. I. 
(2009). Circular analysis in systems 
neuroscience: the dangers of double 
dipping. Nat. Neurosci. 12, 535–540.
Kumar, P., Waiter, G., Ahearn, T., Milders, 
M., Reid, I., and Steele, J. D. (2008). 
Abnormal temporal difference reward-
learning signals in major depression. 
Brain 131, 2084–2093.
Leppanen, J. M., Milders, M., Bell, J. S., 
Terriere, E., and Hietanen, J. K. (2004). 
Depression biases the recognition of 
emotionally neutral faces. Psychiatry 
Res 128, 123–133.
Logothetis, N. K. (2008). What we can do 
and what we cannot do with fMRI. 
Nature 453, 869–878.
Logothetis, N. K., Pauls, J., Augath, M., 
Trinath, T., and Oeltermann, A. (2001). 
Neurophysiological investigation of 
the basis of the fMRI signal. Nature 
412, 150–157.
Marcar, V. L., Straessle, A., Girard, F., 
Loenneker, T., and Martin, E. (2004). 
When more means less: a paradox 
BOLD response in human visual 
cortex. Magn. Reson. Imaging 22, 
441–450.
Mazziotta, J., Toga, A., Evans, A., Fox, P., 
Lancaster, J., Zilles, K., Woods, R., Paus, 
T., Simpson, G., Pike, B., Holmes, C., 
Collins, L., Thompson, P., MacDonald, 
D., Iacoboni, M., Schormann, T., 
Amunts, K., Palomero-Gallagher, N., 
Geyer, S., Parsons, L., Narr, K., Kabani, 
N., Le Goualher, G., Boomsma, D., 
Cannon, T., Kawashima, R., and 
Mazoyer, B. (2001). A probabilistic atlas 
and reference system for the human 
brain: International Consortium 
for Brain Mapping (ICBM). Philos. 
Trans. R. Soc. Lond., B, Biol. Sci. 356, 
1293–1322.
Moll, J., and de Oliveira-Souza, R. (2007). 
Moral judgments, emotions and the 
utilitarian brain. Trends Cogn. Sci. 
(Regul. Ed.) 11, 319–321.
Poldrack, R. A. (2006). Can cognitive 
processes be inferred from neuroim-
aging data? Trends Cogn. Sci. (Regul. 
Ed.) 10, 59–63.
Racine, E., Bar-Ilan, O., and Illes, J. (2006). 
Brain imaging – A decade of coverage 
in the print media. Sci. Commun. 28, 
122–143.
Raichle, M. E., and Mintun, M. A. (2006). 
Brain work and brain imaging. Annu. 
Rev. Neurosci. 29, 449–476.
Rapport, M. M., Green, A. A., and Page, 
I. H. (1948). Serum vasoconstrictor, 
serotonin; isolation and characteriza-
tion. J. Biol. Chem. 176, 1243–1251.
Schummers, J., Yu, H. B., and Sur, M. 
(2008). Tuned responses of astrocytes 
and their infl uence on hemodynamic 
signals in the visual cortex. Science 320, 
1638–1643.
Seminowicz, D. A., Mayberg, H. S., 
McIntosh, A. R., Goldapple, K., 
Kennedy, S., Segal, Z., and Rafi -Tari, 
S. (2004). Limbic-frontal circuitry 
in major depression: a path mod-
eling metanalysis. Neuroimage 22, 
409–418.
Sirotin, Y. B., and Das, A. (2009). 
Anticipatory haemodynamic signals 
in sensory cortex not predicted by 
local neuronal activity. Nature 457, 
475–479.
Tsushima, Y., Taketomi-Takahashi, A., 
and Endo, K. (2005). Prevalence of 
abnormal fi ndings on brain magnetic 
resonance (MR) examinations in adult 
participants of brain docking. BMC 
Neurol. 5, 18.
Weber, F., and Knopf, H. (2006). Incidental 
fi ndings in magnetic resonance imag-
ing of the brains of healthy young men. 
J. Neurol. Sci. 240, 81–84.
Yarkoni, T. (2009). Big correlations in lit-
tle studies. Perspect. Psychol. Stud. 4, 
294–298.
Conflict of interest Statement: The 
authors declare that the research was con-
ducted in the absence of any commercial or 
fi nancial relationships that could be con-
strued as a potential confl ict of interest.
Received: 14 July 2009; paper pending 
published: 16 September 2009; accepted: 
23 November 2009; published online: 23 
December 2009.
Citation: Schleim S and Roiser JP 
(2009) fMRI in translation: the chal-
lenges facing real-world applica-
tions. Front. Hum. Neurosci. 3:63. doi: 
10.3389/neuro.09.063.2009
Copyright © 2009 Schleim and Roiser. This is 
an open-access article subject to an exclusive 
license agreement between the authors and 
the Frontiers Research Foundation, which 
permits unrestricted use, distribution, and 
reproduction in any medium, provided the 
original authors and source are credited.
